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PROPERTY
I. JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS-INTER VIVOS OWNERSHIP
In Clinkscales v. Clinkscales,1 the South Carolina Supreme
Court made its first determination of the inter vivos interests of
persons named as co-owners of a joint bank account. The court
held that when a husband deposits his own funds in a bank ac-
count and subsequently converts the account to a joint account
in his own name and that of his wife, he is presumed to have
made a gift of one-half of the funds so deposited while both are
living.2 This ruling places South Carolina in a small minority of
the American jurisdictions that have ruled on this issues and
raises questions concerning the ultimate effects of such a
decision.
The parties in Clinkscales were married in June 1978.4 Dur-
ing the first week of their marriage, the husband opened a
checking account and, within a few days, converted it to a joint
account in the names of himself and his wife. Differences soon
arose between the couple, and, within three weeks of their mar-
riage, the wife left her husband, withdrawing all funds from the
joint account.5 The husband then initiated an action in family
court seeking a legal separation and an order for the return of
the funds.6 The trial judge found that the husband had intended
to make a gift of the funds in the account7 and denied the hus-
band's petition for their return. On appeal, the supreme court
held that the husband's donative intent extended to only one-
half of the funds and directed that the other half be returned to
the husband.8
1. - S.C. -, 270 S.E.2d 715 (1980).
2. Id. at -, 270 S.E.2d at 716.
3. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text infra.
4. Brief of Appellant at 7.
5. Id. at 8.
6. Appellant sought return of $10,321.18, which was the total of the only two checks
written against the account by the wife-one in the amount of $781.19 to satisfy her
indebtedness on an automobile, and the other in the amount of $9,539.99 to close out the
joint account. Id.
7. Record at 129-30.
8. - S.C. at -, 270 S.E.2d at 716.
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As a general rule, when money belonging to one person is
deposited in an account in the names of the depositor and an-
other, the intent of the depositor is the controlling element in
the determination of the relationship created between the par-
ties and the interest of the noncontributing party in the account
funds.9 Previous South Carolina cases have limited the nonde-
positing party's interest to the right of survivorship' and have
predicated the transfer of this interest from the depositor to the
nondepositor on theories of contract and gift.11 Under the con-
tract theory, the nondepositing party acquires an interest in the
funds through the written deposit agreement between the bank
and the parties named on the account and thus stands in the
shoes of a third party beneficiary to a contract.12 Under the gift
theory, courts look to the intent of the depositor: if the intent to
make a gift is found, that intent is given effect.' 3 When applying
9. Austin v. Summers, 237 S.C. 613, 620, 118 S.E.2d 684, 687 (1961). Accord, Murray
v. Gadsden, 197 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1952); O'Hair v. O'Hair, 109 Ariz. 236, 508 P.2d 66
(1973); Flynn v. Hinsley, 142 Conn. 257, 113 A.2d 351 (1955); Maier v. Bean, 189 So. 2d
380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); In re Estate of Lewis, 97 Idaho 299, 543 P.2d 852 (1975);
In re Estate of Hochner, 31 IlM. App. 3d 523, 334 N.E.2d 802 (1975); O'Brien v. Biegger,
233 Iowa 1179, 11 N.W.2d 412 (1943); Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 106 A.2d
72 (1954); In re Lewis' Estate, 194 Miss. 480, 13 So. 2d 20 (1943); In re Wszolek Estate,
112 N.H. 310, 295 A.2d 444 (1972); Browne v. Sieg, 55 N.M. 447, 234 P.2d 1045 (1951);
Menger v. Otero County State Bank, 44 N.M. 82, 98 P.2d 834 (1940); Kelly v. Beers, 194
N.Y. 49, 86 N.E. 980 (1909); Hall v. Hall, 235 N.C. 711, 71 S.E.2d 471 (1952); Held v.
Myers, 48 Ohio App. 131, 192 N.E. 540 (1934); In re Estate of Chiara, 467 Pa. 586, 359
A.2d 756 (1976); Slepkow v. Robinson, 113 R.L 550, 324 A.2d 321 (1974); Christensen v.
Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah 478, 286 P. 638 (1930); Tucker v. Merchants Bank, 135 Vt.
597, 382 A.2d 212 (1977); Wrenn v. Daniels, 200 Va. 419, 106 S.E.2d 126 (1958); Pfeifer v.
Pfeifer, 1 Wis. 2d 609, 85 N.W.2d 370 (1957).
10. See, e.g., Johnson v. Herrin, 272 S.C. 224, 250 S.E.2d 334 (1978); Gilford v.
South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 257 S.C. 374, 186 S.E.2d 258 (1972); Austin v. Summers, 237
S.C. 613, 118 S.E.2d 684 (1961); Hawkins v. Thackston, 224 S.C. 445, 79 S.E.2d 714
(1954).
11. The court has used both theories at various times and has avoided the express
adoption of one over the other. See Johnson v. Herrin, 272 S.C. 224, 250 S.E.2d 334
(1978) (gift theory); Gilford v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 257 S.C. 374, 186 S.E.2d 258
(1972) (contract theory); Austin v. Summers, 237 S.C. 613, 118 S.E.2d 684 (1961)(gift and
contract theories); Hawkins v. Thackston, 224 S.C. 445, 79 S.E.2d 714 (1954)(contract
theory). The only reasonable explanation for this vacillation is that the theory to be
applied in a particular case will depend upon the unique facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the transfer of interest to the nondepositing party. See 272 S.C. at 228, 250
S.E.2d at 336.
12. Hawkins v. Thackston, 224 S.C. at 451, 79 S.E.2d at 717.
13. See, e.g., White v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 53 Cal. App. 2d
831, 128 P.2d 600 (1942); Chase Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Sullivan, 127 So. 2d 112 (Fla.
2
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the gift theory, the court has relied upon section 34-11-10 of the
South Carolina Code14 to determine that the establishment of a
joint bank account in conformity with statutory provisions gives
rise to a rebuttable presumption that the parties to the account
intended the funds to be paid to the survivor as owner.15
In Clinkscales, the court extended the foregoing presump-
tion to include the intent to create inter vivos rights in the non-
depositing party when the parties are husband and wife and ex-
plained that "[s]ince the statute [section 34-11-10] makes no
distinction as to those 'living or not,' the presumption concern-
ing intent equally applies prior to the death of one of the indi-
viduals."1 6 With the requisite intent thus established, the court
concluded that, under the gift theory, the husband's deposit of
funds effected an inter vivos transfer to his wife. The holding in
Clinkscales, that the wife received a present interest in the
funds deposited in the joint account by her husband, is consis-
tent with results reached in a number of other jurisdictions."
After finding a joint ownership of funds in a joint account,
1960); Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962); In re Estate of Fanning,
263 Ind. 414, 333 N.E.2d 80 (1975); O'Brien v. Biegger, 233 Iowa 1179, 11 N.W.2d 412
(1943); Corkum v. Salvation Army, 340 Mass. 165, 162 N.E.2d 778 (1959); Wantuck v.
United Say. & Loan Ass'n, 461 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. 1971); Burns v. Nolette, 83 N.H. 489,
144 A. 848 (1929); Cziger v. Berstein, 33 N.J. Super. 404, 110 A.2d 560 (1954); Menger v.
Otero County State Bank, 44 N.M. 82, 98 P.2d 834 (1940); In re Estate of Voegeli, 108
Ohio App. 371, 161 N.E.2d 778 (1959), appeal dismissed, 169 Ohio St. 237, 158 N.E.2d
893 (1959); Beach v. Holland, 172 Or. 396, 142 P.2d 990 (1943); Pfeifer v. Pfeifer, 1 Wis.
2d 609, 85 N.W.2d 370 (1957). The traditional gift elements of completed delivery and
relinquishment of control are not strictly required for a finding of gift in South Carolina,
presumably because such events are inconsistent with joint ownership of funds. See
Austin v. Summers, 237 S.C. at 622, 118 S.E.2d at 688.
14. The statute provides in pertinent part-
When any deposit has been made in any bank... transacting business in
this State in the names of two persons, payable to either or payable to either or
the survivor, such deposit or any part thereof may be paid to either of such
persons, whether the other be living or not and the receipt or acquittance of
the person so paid shall be a valid and sufficient release and discharge for any
and all payments so made.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-11-10 (1976).
15. - S.C. at _, 270 S.E.2d at 716.
16. Id.
17. Id. Other jurisdictions have reached similar results. See, e.g., Estate of Barnhart
v. Burkhardt, 38 Colo. App. 544, 563 P.2d 972 (1977); Teasley v. Blankenberg, 298 So. 2d
431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); In re Estate of McGill, 54 Ill. App. 3d 533, 371 N.E.2d 6
(1977); In re Estate of Fanning, 263 Ind. 414, 333 N.E.2d 80 (1975); O'Brien v. Biegger,
233 Iowa 1179, 11 N.W.2d 412 (1943); In re Lewis' Estate, 194 Miss. 480, 13 So. 2d 20
(1943); In re Estate of Keeney, 465 Pa. 45, 348 A.2d 108 (1975).
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the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the troublesome
question of the extent of the inter vivos rights of depositor and
nondepositor. Although a number of other courts have held that
a nondepositor has a present interest in a joint bank accounts
no clear majority rule has emerged regarding the extent of that
interest.
The question usually arises, as it did in Clinkscales, in con-
nection with a determination of the effect of a withdrawal of all
or part of the funds by one party. Because most courts hold that
the funds are held jointly with a right of survivorship,9 joint
accounts normally are viewed as joint tenancies with rights of
survivorship. Nevertheless, treatment of the inter vivos rights of
the joint tenants varies widely. Some states hold that either
joint tenant has a right to withdraw all of the funds with no
liability to the other party.2 0 Other states have ruled that the
joint tenancy follows the withdrawn funds, so that both paries
retain their rights of survivorship and can trace those rights into
property purchased by the withdrawing party.21 Two states re-
gard the joint account as a severable joint tenancy, so that a
withdrawal of funds by one party constitutes a severance of the
joint tenancy.2 2 Upon withdrawal by one party, the parties to
the account become tenants in common, with each entitled to a
moiety (one-half) of the original funds,23 and the right of survi-
vorship is extinguished. Only New York has carried this reason-
ing to its logical conclusion with an express ruling that a joint
tenant to a bank account who withdraws a sum in excess of his
moiety is liable to the other tenant for the excess.2 4
In Clinkscales, the South Carolina Supreme Court avoided
18. See note 17 supra.
19. See notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text supra.
20. In these states, the withdrawal is deemed a dissipation of the joint property. As
a result, the co-ownership is not a true joint tenancy. See generally Staples v. Berry, 110
Me. 32, 85 A. 303 (1912); Sody v. Sody, 32 Md. App. 644, 363 A.2d 568 (1976); Kranjcec
v. Belinak, 114 Mont. 26, 132 P.2d 150 (1942); In re Whiteside's Estate, 159 Neb. 362, 67
N.W.2d 141 (1954); Wambeke v. Hopkin, 372 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 1962).
21. See American Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 131 Cal. App. 2d 382, 280 P.2d 545
(1955); Ambruster v. Ambruster, 326 Mo. 51, 31 S.W.2d 28 (1930); State v. Gralewski's
Estate, 176 Or. 448, 159 P.2d 211 (1945).
22. Goc v. Goc, 134 N.J. Eq. 61, 33 A.2d 870 (1943); Stanger v. Epler, 382 Pa. 411,
115 A.2d 197 (1955).
23. Goc v. Goc, 134 N.J. Eq. 61, 33 A.2d 870 (1943); Bricker v. Krimer, 13 N.Y.2d
22, 191 N.E.2d 795, 241 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1963).
24. E.g., Bricker v. Krimer, 13 N.Y.2d at 27, 191 N.E.2d at 797, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 4116.
[Vol. 33
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determining the extent of the parties' inter vivos rights in their
joint account on the basis of joint tenancy. Instead, it relied on
the presumption, recognized in a minority of states, that a hus-
band who deposits his own funds in a bank in his name and that
of his wife intends to make a gift to her of one-half of the funds
deposited in the account.2 5 The adoption of this presumption in
Clinkscales2e provided a convenient means by which the hus-
band could recover at least a portion of the funds that he had
deposited in the joint account, but it left undetermined the ex-
tent of inter vivos rights of joint account owners who are not
husband and wife.
Although the court has not yet ruled on the precise question
of the inter vivos rights of depositing and nondepositing parties
to funds in joint accounts, South Carolina may follow the small
group of states that regards joint accounts as severable joint ten-
ancies with rights of survivorship.27 In Austin v. Summers,'2  a
1961 decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court considered the
inter vivos rights of two co-owners of a joint account, neither of
whom was the depositing party,29 and held that when "both par-
ties have substantial interests in a joint account,. . neither can
appropriate the whole without liability to the other."' 0 Referring
25. Id. (citing 41 C.J.S. Husband & Wife § 153A (1944)). States that apply a formal
husband-and-wife gift presumption are Florida, Illinois, Nebraska, New Jersey, and New
York. See Williams v. Williams, 177 So. 2d 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)(gift of the
whole); Estate of Fitterer v. Fitterer, 27 IM. App. 2d 264, 169 N.E.2d 578 (1960)(gift of
the whole); Scriven v. Scriven, 153 Neb. 655, 45 N.W.2d 760 (1951)(gift of the whole);
Goc v. Goc, 134 N.J. Eq. 61, 33 A.2d 870 (1943)(gift of one-half); Lambert v. Lambert, 42
A.D.2d 903, 347 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1973)(gift of one-half); Susan W. v. Martin W., 89 Misc.
2d 681, 392 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1977)(gift of one-half).
26. South Carolina courts previously have applied a presumption of a gift to convey-
ances of property from a husband to his wife, but donative intent has not been limited to
only half of whatever property was placed in the wife's name. See Long v. Conroy, 246
S.C. 225, 143 S.E.2d 459 (1965). The supreme court has included language in dictum that
may be viewed as a precursor to the express adoption of the new presumption in Clink-
scales. See Langston v. Langston, 250 S.C. 363, 375, 157 S.E.2d 858, 864 (1967).
27. See note 22 supra.
28. 237 S.C. 613, 118 S.E.2d 684 (1961).
29. The funds in the joint account in Austin were deposited by the original owner in
the names of himself, his wife, and his daughter. After the original owner's death, the
daughter withdrew all of the funds from the account. After the death of the wife, the
administrator of the wife's estate brought suit to recover the funds. The court found that
the wife and daughter were joint owners with right of survivorship upon the death of the
original owner. Id. at 622, 118 S.E.2d at 688.
30. Id. at 623, 118 S.E.2d at 688.
1981]
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to the co-owners as joint tenants, the court stated that either
party was entitled to withdraw one-half of the funds without be-
coming liable to the other and that either could terminate the
joint tenancy by withdrawing half of the funds.31
In Clinkscales, the court ruled that a joint account estab-
lished with the funds of a party to the account raises the pre-
sumption of an intent on the part of the depositor to transfer a
present interest and a right of survivorship to the nondepositing
party.3 2 Therefore, absent evidence sufficient to show a contrary
intent by the depositor, both the depositor and the nondepositor
should meet the substantial interest standard of Austin.3 Con-
sequently, each would be entitled to half the funds, each would
be able to sever the joint tenancy and destroy the right of survi-
vorship by withdrawing his half, and each would be liable to the
other for sums withdrawn in excess thereof. It should be noted
that, although the court avoided an express adoption of the joint
tenancy analysis in Clinkscales, it reached the same result by
employing a presumption that the donative intent of the hus-
band extended to only one-half of the funds deposited" and
cited Austin for the result. 5 This suggests that the court proba-
bly will use the joint tenancy analysis in future cases concerning
inter vivos rights of joint account owners who are not husband
and wife.
The probability that the South Carolina Supreme Court will
adopt the joint tenancy analysis raises serious questions regard-
ing the desirability of establishing joint accounts in which all the
funds are deposited by one party. Opening such an account then
would create a true joint tenancy with the depositor thereby di-
vesting himself of exclusive control over the funds deposited.
Once the deposit is made, the depositor would have no greater
right to the entire amount than would the nondepositing party.33
Yet, depositors often establish joint accounts for purposes other
than the transfer of present ownership to the nondepositing
31. Id. at 623, 118 S.E.2d at 689.
32. - S.C. at --- , 270 S.E.2d at 716.
33. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
34. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
35. - S.C. at -, 270 S.E.2d at 716.
36. In the past, the depositing party has had a preemptive right to the funds, which
allowed him to terminate the joint account by withdrawing all the funds or by changing
the deposit agreement. See Austin v. Summers, 237 S.C. at 623, 118 S.E.2d at 683.
[Vol. 33
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party. If the depositor's primary purpose is to give a right of
survivorship to the nondepositor37 or simply to give the nonde-
positor access to the funds for the convenience of the deposi-
tor,38 he can ensure the accomplishment of his purpose only by
making an express and unambiguous indication of his intent at
the time the account is established. Furthermore, a prospective
depositor in a joint account that is considered a joint tenancy
should recognize that creditors of a nondepositing party may be
able to reach that party's share of the funds and should be
aware of the possible tax consequences of Clinkscales.39
H. PROTECTIONS TO PURCHASERS IN HOME SALES
On three separate occasions in 1980, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court either expressly or impliedly approved and imple-
mented its statement of policy in Lane v. Trenholm Building
Co.4 0 that "the innocent purchaser should be protected from la-
tent defects"' 1 in transactions for purchases of homes. Although
the statement in Lane pertained to the sale of new homes by
vendors or vendor-builders, it reflects a public policy that South
37. E.g., Johnson v. Herrin, 272 S.C. 224, 250 S.E.2d 334 (1978) (account established
for primary purpose of facilitating administration of testatrix' estate). Other jurisdictions
have recognized a similar purpose. See, e.g., Bachmann v. Reardon, 138 Conn. 665, 88
A.2d 391 (1952); Constance v. Constance, 366 So. 2d 804 (FI. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
38. Convenience accounts most often are established by a depositor who is unable to
travel to a bank, so that the nondepositing party may make deposits and withdrawals for
the depositor. See, e.g., Murray v. Gadsden, 197 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Lawrence v.
Lawrence, 246 Ark. 230, 437 S.W.2d 457 (1969); Josephson v. Kuhner, 139 So. 2d 440
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Estate of Hayes v. Blake, 131 l App. 2d 563, 268 N.E.2d 501
(1971); Miles v. Caples, 362 Mass. 107, 286 N.E.2d 231 (1972); Ison v. Ison, 410 S.W.2d
65 (Mo. 1967); Guilinger v. Guilinger, 433 P.2d 946 (Okla. 1967).
39. Before Clinkscales, money deposited in a joint bank account by the donor was
not considered a taxable gift until the funds were withdrawn by the donee, because the
gift was considered revocable until that time. Tress. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4) (1958). The
presumption established in Clinkscales that a gift of one-half of the funds is made at the
time of deposit could result in a determination by the Internal Revenue Service that a
taxable gift is made at that time, requiring the filing of a gift tax return under I.R.C.
§ 6019(a) if the gift exceeds the $3,000 annual exclusion provided for in I.R.C. § 2503(b).
This presumption of gift could also have serious effects on the gift and estate tax marital
deductions, see I.R.C. §§ 2056 and 2523, and on the amount included in gross and taxa-
ble estates. See generally I.R.C. §§ 2033 and 2053. For further discussion of possible
problems concerning joint tenancy bank accounts, see Note, Joint Tenancy Bank Ac-
counts Inter Vivos Rights, 23 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 141 (1971).
40. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976). For a discussion of this case, see Property,
Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 29 S.C.L. Rav. 181 (1977).
41. 267 S.C. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
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Carolina courts recognize as applicable to all home sales. As a
result, this basic tenet protecting the purchaser has been applied
to sales by owner-occupants as well as by vendor-builders, and
the supreme court has continued to expand the umbrella of pro-
tections afforded to purchasers in cases where latent defects are
discovered after purchase.
A. Trend Away From Caveat Emptor Approved and
Continued
In MacFarlane v. Manly,4" the supreme court expressly re-
affirmed its intention to continue the trend of the law away from
the doctrine of caveat emptor and to hold the seller to a strict
accountability in the sale of residential real estate. MacFarlane
was an action for fraud and deceit brought by home purchasers
against the sellers based on the sellers' failure to disclose termite
and water damage. MacFarlane, the buyer, agreed to accept the
property "as is,' 4 and, because he was out of town during a
large part of the transaction, he relied upon the sellers' real es-
tate agent to have the premises inspected for termite infesta-
tion." The exterminator hired by the sellers' agent certified that
the property had been "inspected and found to be free of any
active termite infestation,"'45 but did not disclose severe termite
damage from a prior infestation.4' Not only were the sellers
aware of this, but it was "inescapable" that the exterminators
had observed the damage but had failed to mention it in their
report.47 Their letter stated only that no active infestation had
been observed and that the house was subject to undisclosed
42. 274 S.C. 392, 264 S.E.2d 838 (1980).
43. Record at 71.
44. Id. at 69.
45. - S.C. at -, 264 S.E.2d at 839. The text of the letter read as follows:
This is to certify that the property... has been inspected and found to be
free and clear of any active termite infestation.
This report is not to be construed as a guarantee, but rather is the opinion)
of a qualified inspector and the building is subject to undisclosed infestation
and/or damage.
Id.
46. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that many of the sills and joists of the house
were so damaged that they would have to be replaced, that a large portion of the sub-
flooring was damaged, and that "a portion of the floor was being held in place and sup-
ported by six metal jacks." Record at 2.
47. 274 S.C. at 393, 264 S.E.2d at 839.
[Vol. 33
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infestation or damage.48
The trial court granted summary judgment to the sellers,
ruling that, because the exterminator was an agent of the buyers
as a matter of law, his knowledge of the damage was imputed to
the buyers and they could not be deceived regarding the condi-
tion of the house.49 In addition, the trial court found that there
was no fraud as a matter of law and that the "as is" clause in the
sales contract operated to make applicable the doctrine of ca-
veat emptor, which "generally exempts the [d]efendant from lia-
bility for defects in the premises existing at the time of convey-
ance .... ,,50 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case for a determination of whether the extermi-
nator, who had been procured and directed by the sellers' real
estate agent but who nominally was performing a service for the
buyer, was acting as agent for buyer or seller.51 Should it be as-
certained that the exterminator was not the agent of the buyer,
the court explained, the trier of fact could find for the buyer
upon sufficient proof of the other elements of the cause of action
for fraud and deceit.52 Then, relying on the South Carolina rule
that "the doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply in cases of
fraud, ' 3 the court stated that the "as is" clause in the MacFar-
48. Id. See note 45 supra.
49. 274 S.C. at 394, 264 S.E.2d at 840.
50. Record at 71.
51. 274 S.C. at 395, 264 S.E.2d at 840.
52. The nine elements required to be shown in order to recover for actual fraud are
as follows: a representation; falsity of the representation; materiality of the representa-
tion; knowledge of the falsity or a reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the repre-
sentation; intent that the representation induce action by the hearer; the hearer's igno-
rance of the falsity; reliance upon the representation; justification for the reliance; and
injury resulting from the reliance. Moorhead v. First Piedmont Bank & Trust Co., 273
S.C. 356, 359, 256 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1979)(citing O'Shields v. Southern Fountain Mobile
Homes, 262 S.C. 276, 204 S.E.2d 50 (1974); Carter v. Boyd Constr. Co., 255 S.C. 274, 276,
178 S.E.2d 536, 539 (1971); Moye v. Wilson Motors, Inc., 254 S.C. 471, 473, 176 S.E.2d
147, 151 (1970)). The plaintiffs in MacFarlane claimed fraud on the basis of failure to
disclose a material fact-the termite damage. Therefore, instead of showing a false repre-
sentation among the elements listed above, they would be required at trial on the merits
to show the seller's duty to disclose the fact in question and the failure to disclose. See
Lawson v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 259 S.C. 477, 480, 193 S.E.2d 124, 128 (1972).
In a sale of property, if the seller is aware of a latent defect or hidden condition that is
not discoverable on reasonable examination, it is his duty to disclose the defect.
"[Flailure to do so may be made the basis of a charge of fraud." Id. at 482, 193 S.E.2d at
127 (quoting 37 AM. Ju. 2D, Fraud & Deceit § 158 (1968)).
53. 274 S.C. at 395, 264 S.E.2d at 840 (quoting Lawson v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l
Bank, 259 S.C. at 486, 193 S.E.2d at 129 (1972)). See Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C.
9
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lane contract did not constitute an absolute defense." The court
noted with approval the "recent trend at the law. . . to hold the
seller to a more strict accountability. "55
Four years before MacFarlane, the South Carolina Supreme
Court discussed at length the doctrine of caveat emptor in con-
nection with the sale of houses. In Lane v. Trenholm Building
Co.,"5 the court attacked the application of caveat emptor in
home purchases in two ways. First, the court characterized the
sale of a house as a "sale of a product, similar to the sale of
personalty, ' 57 because "the essence of the transaction is the sale
of a house and not a transfer of a parcel of land."58 By removing
the transaction from the sphere of real property, the court
placed it beyond the reach of caveat emptor, which is a principle
of real property law. 9 The court also stated that the principle
should not be applied because "the court in this State has con-
sistently rejected caveat emptor and adopted the civil law rule
of caveat venditor as part of the common law of South Caro-
lina." 0 Stating that "[tihe law should not orphan the purchaser
of a house .. . by the operation of the doctrine of caveat
emptor,"61 the court intimated that future decisions would con-
tinue to protect the purchaser in cases of latent defects in
407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970); Frasher v. Cofer, 251 S.C. 112, 160 S.E.2d 560 (1968).
54. 274 S.C. at 395, 264 S.E.2d at 840.
55. Id. at 396, 264 S.E.2d at 840.
56. 267 S.C. at 497, 229 S.E.2d at 728.
57. Id. at 501, 229 S.E.2d at 730.
58. Id. (citing Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970)).
59. 254 S.C. at 412, 175 S.E.2d at 794. While finding an implied warranty in the sale
of a house by a vendor, the court in Lane recognized that the application of caveat
venditor to the sale in question might afford the purchaser more protection than he
would have received had the sale of the house actually been a sale of goods, governed by
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)(S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-101 to -803 (1976)). The
court stated that under the UCC there might be no implied warranty because the seller
may not have been a merchant as defined in § 36-2-104 and as required by § 36-2-314 for
the existence of implied warranties in the sale of goods. This, however, was found to be
of little consequence. Noting that the UCC was adopted in order to provide uniformity
in multistate transactions, the court declared that the application of caveat venditor was
appropriate in sales of homes because they are local transactions and "considerations of
nationwide uniformity are of minimal concern." 267 S.C. at 504, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
60. 267 S.C. at 502, 229 S.E.2d at 730. The court cited and discussed the following
early cases to support this proposition: Smith v. McCall, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 220
(1821); Misroon & Timmons v. Waldo & Freeman, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 76 (1819);
Champreys v. Johnson, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 268 (1809); Timrod v. Shoolbred, 1 S.C.L. (1
Bay) 324 (1793).
61. 267 S.C. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
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houses.0 2 The decision in MacFarlane fulfilled the prophecy of
Lane by extending protection to the buyer.
B. Seller Held Liable for Misrepresentations 6f Agent
The South Carolina Supreme Court continued the trend of
providing protections to the "innocent purchaser"' s of a house in
Byrn v. Walker." In Byrn, the court extended the reach of the
purchaser's remedies for fraud and deceit by holding that a
seller shares liability with his selling agent for the agent's mis-
representations, even if the misrepresentations are outside the
scope of the agent's express authority and the seller is unaware
of the agent's actions.6 5
The owner of a lakeside home signed a written listing agree-
ment with a realtor who then arranged a sale to the buyer.
While showing the house to the buyer, the agent represented to
her that the realty company had sold the house before and was
well acquainted with the property.8 6 He then stated that the
house had a particular type of heating system, when, in fact,
there was no heating system at all. The agent further claimed
that the building was structurally sound, although improper
construction had rendered it unsafe and subject to eventual col-
lapse, and misrepresented the condition of the swimming pool
and the plumbing in the house.67 The house was surrounded on
three sides by water, with retaining walls constructed to prevent
erosion of the land. These walls were represented as being in
good condition but later were found to be leaning badly because
of improper construction. All of these defects in the house and
surrounding property were hidden and were not readily ascer-
tainable by the buyer. The buyer purchased the property in reli-
ance upon the representations made to her by the seller's
agent.
68
The buyer asserted fraud as a counterclaim against the
62. Although the court based its decision in Lane on an implied warranty from a
builder-vendor, the discussion of caveat emptor applies equally to other types of actions
dealing with purchases of houses.
63. 267 S.C. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
64. - S.C. _-, 267 S.E.2d 601 (1980).
65. Id. at , 267 S.E.2d at 604.
66. Id. at _, 267 S.E.2d at 602.
67. Id. at - 267 S.E.2d at 603.
68. Id. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 604.
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seller and a cross-claim against the agent in the seller's action
for foreclosure on the buyer's mortgage. The trial court entered
judgment for the seller on the foreclosure and denied the buyer
any relief on her claims for fraud.69 The ruling on the issue of
fraud was based upon the trial judge's determination that the
buyer was not justified in relying upon the agent's representa-
tions70 and that no showing had been made of the agent's knowl-
edge of their falsity. The buyer appealed that portion of the
judgment concerning her claim of fraud.
The supreme court reversed the judgment on the issue of
fraud, holding that, "[W]here, as here, the agent asserts special
knowledge of the property and makes representations of facts,
the truth of which are not reasonably ascertainable to the pur-
chaser due to their latent nature, the purchaser can justifiably
rely on those representations." The court relied upon the rule
of previous cases that, when representations are made in reck-
less disregard of the truth, a showing of actual knowledge is not
required to establish fraudulent misrepresentation.7 2 The court
found that the record established reckless disregard on the part
of the agent.73
Having determined that the agent was personally liable to
the buyer for fraud and deceit in the sale of the house, the court
then addressed the seller's contention that he should not be held
liable for his agent's misrepresentation. The seller argued that
the agent had been employed to sell the house under a written
listing agreement and the misrepresentations made by the agent
were outside the express authority given to him in that agree-
ment.7 4 The court rejected this argument, holding that, because
the misrepresentations were made in the course of the agent's
authorized sale of the house, the seller was responsible for the
agent's acts under the general authority given in the written list-
ing agreement.7 5 Because the buyer of the house had no knowl-
69. Id. at ., 267 S.E.2d at 602.
70. Id. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 603.
71. Id. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 604.
72. Id. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 603 (citing Gilbert v. Mid-South Mach. Co., 267 S.C.
211, 227 S.E.2d 189 (1976); Young v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 244 S.C. 493, 137 S.E.2d 578
(1964)).
73. - S.C. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 603.
74. Record at 10.
75. In so holding, the court relied upon 37 AM. Jur. 2D, Fraud & Deceit § 316
[Vol. 33
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edge of the written listing agreement, the court, in determining
the liability of the seller for his agent's misrepresentations, held
that she was not bound by the agreement.76
Although the court in Byrn does not discuss the trend of
the law toward greater protection of the purchaser, the case
clearly is in keeping with the concept of caveat venditor dis-
cussed in Lane.7 7 By establishing a rule that the seller is liable
for his agent's misrepresentations even when they are outside
the agent's express authority, the court, in effect, created a true
case of caveat venditor---"Let the seller beware. '78 The resulting
extension of the buyer's remedies is a further manifestation of
the court's belief that "the innocent purchaser should be pro-
tected from latent defects."7 9
C. Implied Warranty in Purchase of Home Extended to
Subsequent Purchasers
In Terlinde v. Neely,80 the South Carolina Supreme Court
expressly followed the lead of Lane and, for the third time in
1980, increased the protections available to home buyers. In
Terlinde, the court held that subsequent purchasers of a home
could pursue causes of action against the home builder in con-
tract and tort for latent defects during a "reasonable period" af-
(1968), which states:
If the representations are made by the agent as a part of the negotiation
for the purpose of bringing about the sale, and by means of this it is brought
about, the conveyance made, and the proceeds of the sale received, this brings
the case within the general rule that a principal is responsible for such acts of
his agent as are done within the scope of his authority, whether authorized or
not, except by the general authority to do the principal act.
Id. This is a reflection of the general policy that the principal will be held liable for any
act done by his agent within the scope of the agent's apparent authority, even if directly
contrary to the principal's instruction, unless the third person with whom the agent dealt
knew that he was exceeding his express authority. Cook v. Canal Ins. Co., 245 S.C. 238,
241, 140 S.E.2d 166, 170 (1965)(citing Williams v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 105 S.C.
305, 89 S.E. 675 (1916); 3 AM. Jun. 2d, Agency § 263 (1968)).
76. - S.C. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 604.
77. 267 S.C. at 502, 229 S.E.2d at 730.
78. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
79. 267 S.C. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
80. - S.C. -, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980). For a more complete discussion of the case,
see Contracts, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 33 S.C.L. Rav. 33, 33-43 (1981).
See also Torts, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 33 S.C.L. Ray. 159, 180 n.138
(1981).
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ter construction of a dwelling."1
Plaintiffs in Terlinde were second purchasers of a house
that had been constructed by defendant builders in 1972 and
first sold in 1973. Shortly after the plaintiffs purchased the
house in 1976, substantial settlement of the foundation oc-
curred, resulting in extremely severe structural damage. 2 In-
spection revealed that the footings of the house were built on fill
dirt, and estimates of the cost of repairs ranged from over $5,000
to almost $23,000.88
The South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that plaintiffs
could maintain an action against the builders for breach of im-
plied warranties of merchantability and of suitability and fitness
for intended purpose and for "negligence, recklessness, and
wilfulness in the construction of the house."' 84 In its continued
effort to protect the innocent purchaser from latent defects, the
court held that "an implied warranty for latent defects extends
to subsequent home purchasers for a reasonable amount of
time."85
What will be considered by the courts to be a "reasonable
amount of time" remains to be seen. The court in Terlinde ap-
pears to base its requirement of "reasonable" time on the length
of time it will take for latent defects to manifest themselves.
The court warns against creating a set time limit, preferring to
decide the matter on a case-by-case basis."8
The court also ruled that the buyers in Terlinde were not
barred by lack of privity from an action against the builders in
tort for negligence. Stating that subsequent buyers were within
the class of consumers for which the home was constructed and
that the builder owed a duty to those who foreseeably would use
his product, the court held that privity between tortfeasor and
injured party was not required.87
81. - S.C. at , 271 S.E.2d at 770.
82. Id. at , 271 S.E.2d at 768.
83. Id. at - 271 S.E.2d at 769.
84. Id. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 768.
85. Id. at , 271 S.E.2d at 770.
86. Id. at , 271 S.E.2d at 769.
87. Id. at ._, 271 S.E.2d at 770.
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D. Conclusion
In MacFarlane, Byrn, and Terlinde, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court has demonstrated clearly its continued endorse-
ment of the policy of protecting innocent purchasers in home
sales.8 It remains to be seen just how far the court will extend
this policy. Current decisions raise the question of what protec-
tions will be left to the seller if the present trend continues.
The endorsement in MacFarlane of the trend away from ca-
veat emptor,e9 considered in connection with Lane's characteri-
zation of home sales as sales of personalty,90 indicates that the
court may be willing to provide purchasers of used homes with
greater protections than those afforded to purchasers of either
land or actual personalty. In purchases of land, the doctrine of
caveat emptor remains applicable.9 1 In the purchase of used
goods in a noncommercial setting, there are few protections for
buyers,92 and sales "as is," which protect the seller, are common
with personalty."e
The holding in Byrn that the seller is liable to the buyer for
the misrepresentations of the seller's agent, even though they
may be outside the scope of the agent's express authority, is con-
sistent with the general principles of agency." However, this
provides little help for the individual homeowner who wishes to
sell his home. By choosing to list the property with an agent, he
assumes the risk of liability for the agent's misrepresentations.95
The extension of implied warranties to subsequent purchas-
88. In Lane, the court noted with approval the South Carolina Legislature's positive
actions in the promotion of consumer protection, through the codification of both the
UCC and § 402A of the RESTATEMEN (SEcoND) OF TorSs. 267 S.C. at 504 n.3, 229 S.E.2d
at 731 n.3.
89. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
90. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
91. Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. at 412, 175 S.E.2d at 794.
92. The sale of goods is governed by the UCC. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-102 (1976).
The implied warranties of § 36-2-314 do not apply to sales by one who is not a merchant
of secondhand goods. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-314, Official Comments 3 & 4 (1976). See J.
WmnS & R. SUMMERS, HANDBooK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNI0RM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-6 at 289 (1972).
93. See 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1516 (1962).
94. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
95. The only readily apparent protections available for the seller in such a case are
the inclusion of a clause in the written listing agreement by which the agent would be
obligated to indemnify the principal for damages incurred as a result of the agent's mis-
conduct, or an action against the agent for breach of duty.
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ers for a reasonable period of time in Terlinde places the vendor
and the builder-vendor in an uncertain position, because the pe-
riod of time required for latent defects to become apparent can
vary widely from case to caseYe Thus, a vendor or builder-ven-
dor could be liable for defects which surface long after the origi-
nal sale of the house.
The court's willingness to extend greater protections to pur-
chasers is perhaps most justified in Terlinde, which was truly an
instance of protecting an innocent purchaser from a vendor who
was better equipped to bear the risk.9 7 In cases like MacFarlane
and Byrn, however, where both buyers and sellers are individual
nonmerchant parties, mechanical application of the "innocent
purchaser" language of Lane could work an injustice upon an
innocent seller.
Nancy R. Jefferis
96. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
97. See notes 61 & 62 and accompanying text supra.
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